The indictment filed last Friday by Special Counsel Robert Mueller explains how Russian military intelligence officers hacked into computer systems of the DNC, the DCCC, and Clinton Campaign employees during the 2016 presidential race. With sweeping, specific details that have compelled unanimous confidence among Americans (except apparently our President), the 29-page indictment is a textbook on sources and methods. No, not intelligence-gathering sources and methods, which are of course highly classified. Instead, the indictment catalogs the sources of data that were stolen, and the methods used by the GRU intelligence units to methodically hack into the targeted systems, exfiltrate the data, evade detection, and weaponize the data through publications timed to inflict maximum impact.
The lessons to be learned from the indictment’s allegations, summarized below, are useful to any organization serious about data security and prevention, detection, and response to hacking, whether state-sponsored or otherwise.
Continue Reading The latest Mueller indictment – what we all can learn about sources and methods

I keep getting asked about Cambridge Analytica and Facebook. And no one seems to like my response – I’m frankly amazed that this all took so long to blow up. How long? How about since 1973. That’s when the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare first articulated the Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs or FIPs) in its report
Testing for technical vulnerabilities is a key part of security risk assessment. To get the straight scoop on technical vulnerabilities, and how they’re exploited, why not ask a hacker?
Would you take a deposition by solely following a template of standard questions, without assessing the unique issues and circumstances of the case? Or conduct transaction due diligence by simply marching though a generic punch list, without assessing the unique aspects of the company, the deal, and the industry? Of course not. Your law firm’s data security posture is no different – you need a security risk assessment to understand your firm’s unique vulnerabilities to security threats, and to identify which security controls are already adequate for your firm and which other safeguards are needed.
I had a nagging worry that something was wrong with my car, so I finally decided to take it to the dealer. I couldn’t exactly describe my concern, except there was an intermittent, “funny noise” coming from somewhere in the front end. An unscrupulous dealer would have taken me down a long path of parts replacement, beginning with tires, then wheels, then tie rods, and on and on, perhaps never fixing the real problem. Fortunately, my dealer was honest and performed diagnostics, ultimately discovering that the rack and pinion was failing. The part was under warranty, so the repair cost me nothing and my funny noise is gone.
As explored in last week’s posts, the
Law firms face significant
It all seemed so routine, so straightforward. The case was settled, with a $500,000 payment to be made to the approved settlement administrator. The law firm received an email from the administrator with wire transfer directions, and the settlement funds were sent per the instructions. Just one problem – the email didn’t come from the administrator, the receiving bank was not the right bank, and the half million dollars evaporated. Poof – gone in an instant.
Sometimes one needs to zoom in to understand the big picture. This year we’ll continue to explore Information Governance, but through the lens of a particular industry segment – law firms – and a particular focus – data security.
How time flies. Seventeen years ago, I went to work for a small, visionary company based in Seattle—Computer Forensics, Inc. Indeed, the founder was so early in the e-discovery and forensics industry that our URL was forensics.com. Laptop drives typically had 8 GB of storage, and servers were more often than not simply a bigger box that sat in a closet.