
The aftermath of the Equifax breach continues. First, the Ugly:
Music Major? Really?
The hoi polloi apparently find it offensive that Equifax’s Chief Security Officer, fired in the breach’s wake, had a music degree. The implication is that someone formally trained long ago in music is clearly incompetent to have a career in IT or Infosec, much less to be a CSO. That must be a surprise to Jennifer Widom (data management researcher, computer science professor, and Dean of Stanford University’s School of Engineering), who somehow, despite her undergraduate music degree, managed to help lay the foundations for active database systems architecture, crucial for such uses as security monitoring. Or to countless others who came to Infosec after formal education in other disciplines – check out #unqualifiedfortech on Twitter.
Yesterday’s thoughtful Washington Post piece was well-titled: Equifax’s security chief had some big problems. Being a music major wasn’t one of them. And if your ironic sensibility remains unsated, see the 10/20/2016 article Musicians May Be the Key to the Cybersecurity Talent Shortage.
Next, the Bad:
Continue Reading Equifax breach – the good, the bad, and the ugly

The grousing began within 24 hours of Equifax’s
In the early 1990s, NSA Director Mike McConnell created a brand-new position at the National Security Agency: Director of Information Warfare. McConnell appointed Rich Wilhelm, with whom McConnell had worked closely on U.S. counter-command & -control intelligence operations during the first Iraq war. After just a few weeks settling into his new job, Wilhelm walked into Director McConnell’s office and said “Mike, we’re kind of f***ed here.”
At last!!! A good reason not to create dozens of hard-to-remember passwords! The updated
A swarm of zombies, led by Byte Walkers, surges inexorably onward to penetrate a massive perimeter wall by force and stealth. Sounds like Game of Thrones, right? Instead, this is our cyberthreat reality. And in an ironic twist that would make George R. R. Martin blush under his beard, it’s now painfully real for
If you’re old enough, you’ll remember a time when businesses actually kept their own information (cue my adult children to roll their eyes). How quaint. We no longer keep most of our information – providers do that for us. We store our data in the cloud, through cloud providers. We outsource business applications to SaaS providers, and even entire systems as PaaS. And we increasingly use service providers to handle key aspects of our business that we used operate internally, resulting in a robust flow of data out of our businesses to such providers, and also the providers generating, receiving, and retaining huge data troves on our behalf.
Many years ago, before common sense kicked in, I thought it would be a good idea to rent a storage space for all the extra furniture and other stuff I could not fit in my new house. Knowing it would only be temporary, I stashed everything from upholstered and leather furniture, to boxes of books. Fast forward twelve months. The rental agreement was expiring, and I realized that I would never need nor have room for all that I’d stored, so I decided to have a sale to dispose of it. When I went to the storage space I was horrified to see that everything was covered in a thin film of mold. (This was years before climate-controlled storage was widely available.) I had no choice but to trash it all, which both cost me money and prevented me from converting my goods to profit.
It’s a common complaint – most U.S. laws requiring data security never cough up the specifics of what must be done to comply. Unlike other areas of business regulation, data security requirements seem hopelessly vague:
In a